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Abstract.	Phenomenal	beliefs	are	beliefs	about	the	phenomenal	properties	of	one's	concurrent	conscious	states.	It	is	an	article	of	common	sense	that	such	beliefs	tend	to	be	justified.	Philosophers	have	been	less	convinced.	It	is	sometimes	claimed	that	phenomenal	beliefs	are	not	on	the	whole	justified,	on	the	grounds	that	(i)	they	are	typically	based	on	introspection	and	(ii)	introspection	is	often	unreliable.	Here	we	argue	that	such	reasoning	must	guard	against	a	potential	conflation	between	two	distinct	introspective	phenomena,	which	we	call	fact-introspection	and	thing-introspection;	arguments	for	the	unreliability	of	introspection	typically	target	only	the	former,	leaving	the	reliability	of	the	latter	untouched	(§1).	In	addition,	we	propose	a	theoretical	framework	for	understanding	thing-introspection	that	may	have	a	surprising	consequence:	thing-introspection	is	not	only	reliable,	but	outright	infallible	(§2).	This	points	at	a	potential	line	of	defense	of	phenomenal-belief	justification,	which	here	we	only	sketch	very	roughly.	
	
	
Introduction	
	Let	phenomenal	beliefs	be	beliefs	about	the	phenomenal	properties	of	one’s	own	current	conscious	states.	In	this	sense,	beliefs	about	one’s	nonconscious	states,	for	example	about	the	dispositional	belief	that	13.9	>	11.34,	are	not	phenomenal	beliefs.	Nor	are	beliefs	about	one’s	past	conscious	states,	such	as	the	belief	that	one’s	gustatory	experience	of	orange	juice	yesterday	at	breakfast	was	quite	pleasant.	Likewise,	beliefs	about	another’s	current	phenomenal	states,	such	as	one’s	belief	that	one’s	friend	feels	pain	right	now,	are	not	phenomenal	beliefs	in	our	sense.	
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Finally,	beliefs	about	the	nonphenomenal	properties	of	one’s	current	conscious	states,	such	as	the	belief	that	one’s	experience	is	occurring	exactly	a	year	after	the	Pope	abdicated,	are	not	phenomenal	beliefs.	For	a	belief	B	to	be	a	phenomenal	belief,	B	must	concern	the	phenomenal	properties	that	a	concurrent	conscious	state	of	the	subject	herself	appears	to	exhibit.i		 According	to	an	important	philosophical	tradition,	going	back	at	least	to	Descartes,	phenomenal	beliefs	have	a	special	epistemic	status:	they	are	infallible	–	having	them	entails	their	truth.	However,	this	tradition	has	been	the	target	of	sustained	attack,	and	it	has	almost	become	a	modern	orthodoxy	that	phenomenal	beliefs	are	not	infallible.		 Some	philosophers	have	called	into	question	not	only	the	infallibility	of	phenomenal	beliefs,	but	even	their	tendency	to	be	justified.	Indeed,	a	significant	and	respectable	challenge	has	been	raised	against	the	reliability	of	phenomenal	belief-formation	processes,	both	by	epistemologists	and	philosophers	of	mind	(Chisholm	1957,	Schwitzgebel	2008),	as	well	as	by	cognitive	scientists	(Nisbett	and	Wilson	1977).	The	basic	reasoning	seems	to	be	that	(i)	phenomenal	beliefs	are	typically	based	on	introspection	and	(ii)	introspection	is	often	unreliable.		 Consider	the	following	pair	of	compelling	arguments	from	Schwitzgebel	(2008).	The	first	is	an	argument	from	the	ineffability	of	conscious	experience:	(1)	if	introspection	were	a	reliable	belief-formation	process,	then	we	would	be	able	to	formulate	detailed	correct	judgments	about	the	phenomenology	of	our	current	conscious	experience;	but	(2)	we	are	not	typically	able	to	form	such	detailed	correct	judgments;	therefore,	(3)	introspection	is	unreliable.	In	support	of	(2)	Schwitzgebel	reports	several	cases	(mostly	from	emotional	and	visual	experience)	in	which	people	are	uncertain	or	mistaken	about	the	phenomenology	of	their	current	conscious	experience.	Schwitzgebel’s	second	argument	is	from	introspective	disagreement.	Consider	the	philosophical	debate	about	so-called	cognitive	phenomenology.	Some	philosophers	maintain	that	conscious	thought	has	a	sui	
generis	phenomenology,	while	others	maintain	that	it	does	not.	Arguably,	however,	
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both	base	their	judgments	on	careful	and	thorough	introspection.	If	introspection	were	a	reliable	belief-formation	process,	both	groups	would	presumably	converge	on	the	same	position	with	respect	to	such	a	fundamental	phenomenal	feature.	Therefore,	introspection	cannot	be	a	reliable	belief-formation	method.		 In	the	bulk	of	this	paper,	we	want	to	argue	that	there	is	at	least	one	kind	of	introspection	which	is	reliable.	Our	case	for	this	has	two	parts,	one	negative	and	one	positive.	In	§1,	we	suggest	that	extant	arguments	against	the	reliability	of	introspection	may	not	apply	to	one	central	form	of	introspection;	we	draw	a	distinction	between	‘fact-introspection’	and	‘thing-introspection’	that	helps	see	why	this	is	so.	In	§2,	we	offer	a	positive	reason	to	think	that	at	least	one	kind	of	introspection	–	thing-introspection	–	must	be	highly	reliable;	we	draw	another	distinction,	between	introspection	and	inner	awareness,	and	develop	a	theoretical	framework	that	helps	see	why	this	is	so.	The	combination	of	both	distinctions	yields	a	coherent	package	deal	with	a	surprising	consequence:	thing-introspection	is	not	only	reliable,	but,	if	our	theoretical	framework	is	accepted,	may	well	turn	out	to	be	infallible.	
	
1. Fact-Introspection	and	Thing-Introspection	
	Our	distinction	between	fact-introspection	and	thing-introspection	is	modeled	after	Fred	Dretske’s	(1993)	distinction	between	fact-awareness	and	thing-awareness	(Giustina	2015).	Dretske’s	distinction	targets	perceptual	awareness,	but	our	claim	is	that	a	parallel	distinction	applies	to	introspective	awareness.	After	presenting	Dretske’s	original	distinction	(§1.1),	we	draw	our	parallel	one	(§1.2),	before	showing	how	it	affects	the	debate	over	the	reliability	of	introspection	(§1.3).		
1.1.	Fact-Awareness	and	Thing-Awareness	Suppose	you	are	visually	presented	with	a	green	tree	and	everything	goes	well.	It	seems	that	at	least	two	reports	are	true	of	you:	
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(1) You	see	the	green	tree.	(2) You	see	that	the	tree	is	green.	The	surface	grammar	of	(1)	and	(2)	is	clearly	different,	but	according	to	Dretske,	the	mental	states	reported	in	(1)	and	(2)	are	also	different.	The	state	reported	in	(1)	he	calls	thing-awareness,	because	what	you	are	said	to	be	(visually)	aware	of	is	a	thing	–	a	(green)	tree.	The	state	reported	in	(2)	Dretske	calls	fact-awareness,	because	what	you	are	said	to	be	(visually)	aware	of	is	the	fact	that	the	tree	is	green.			 A	more	parsimonious	view	would	be	that	these	are	two	stylistically	different	reports,	but	the	underlying	mental	state	they	report	is	one	and	the	same.	Three	important	differences	between	the	reported	states,	however,	rule	this	parsimonious	view	out.	The	first	is	that	fact-awareness	is	a	propositional	attitude	whereas	thing-awareness	is	an	objectual	attitude.	The	second	is	that	fact-awareness	involves	the	deployment	of	concepts	whereas	thing-awareness	does	not.	The	third	is	that	fact-awareness	is	directly	expressible	whereas	thing-awareness	is	not.	Arguably,	the	second	of	these	is	most	fundamental.	On	the	one	hand,	a	content	being	conceptual	appears	to	guarantee,	in	a	language-capable	creature,	that	it	be	expressible;	for	the	creature	can	use	terms	that	express	the	relevant	concepts.	At	the	same	time,	on	a	common	understanding	of	these	notions,	concepts	are	the	constituents	of	propositions,	so	the	right	combination	of	suitably	connected	concepts	would	
constitute	propositional	content.	Nonetheless,	let	us	consider	each	of	these	in	turn.	
Propositional	vs.	Objectual	Attitude.	When	S	is	fact-aware	that	a	is	F,	the	content	of	S’s	mental	state	is	the	proposition	<a	is	F>.	Indeed,	on	Dretske’s	view,	fact-awareness	typically	takes	the	form	of	a	belief.	By	contrast,	when	S	is	thing-aware	of	a,	the	content	of	her	mental	state	is	simply	a,	and	not	a	proposition	involving	a.	Now,	granted,	it	has	sometimes	been	supposed	that	all	ostensibly	objectual	attitudes	are	in	truth	propositional	attitudes.	But	this	position	is	extremely	hard	to	defend	(see	Forbes	2000,	Montague	2007).	It	is	possible	to	be	afraid	of	a	snake	without	quite	being	afraid	that	it	will	bite	you,	or	indeed	that	it	will	harm	you	at	all	–	for	example	when	the	snake	appears	in	a	film.	So	propositional	fear	is	not	
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necessary	for	objectual	fear.	Conversely,	it	seems	intuitively	plausible	that	propositional	love	is	not	sufficient	for	objectual	love:	loving	one’s	partner,	or	one’s	child,	is	not	typically	exhausted	by	loving	that	s/he	is	F1,	that	s/he	is	F2,	and	so	on.	Accordingly,	there	is	no	a	priori	reason	to	suppose	that	propositional	perception	(fact-awareness)	must	be	either	necessary	or	sufficient	for	objectual	perception	(thing-awareness).	In	fact,	there	is	a	strong	reason	to	suppose	the	opposite.	This	is	that	reports	of	the	former	are	referentially	opaque	whereas	reports	of	the	latter	are	referentially	transparent.	Thus,	the	following	inference	appears	perfectly	valid:	S	sees	the	third	tree	from	the	left;	the	third	tree	from	the	left	is	the	tallest	tree	in	the	garden;	therefore,	S	sees	the	tallest	tree	in	the	garden.	By	contrast,	the	following	appears	invalid:	S	sees	that	this	tree	is	the	third	from	the	left;	the	third	tree	from	the	left	is	the	tallest	tree	in	the	garden;	therefore,	S	sees	that	this	tree	is	the	tallest	in	the	garden.	If	S	is	unaware	that	the	third	tree	from	the	left	is	the	garden’s	tallest,	then	in	seeing	that	it	is	the	third	from	the	left	she	would	not	yet	be	seeing	that	it	is	the	garden’s	tallest.		
Concept	Deployment.	For	S	to	be	fact-aware	that	a	is	F,	S	must	have	the	concept	of	a	and	the	concept	of	F	(Dretske	1993:	265).	For	example,	to	be	fact-aware	that	the	toast	is	burning,	you	must	have	the	concept	of	toast	and	the	concept	of	burning.	Being	thing-aware	of	a,	however,	does	not	require	the	mastery	of	any	concept.	A	cat,	for	example,	can	smell	the	burning	toast,	and	thus	be	thing-aware	of	it,	even	if	he	does	not	possess	the	concept	of	toast.	Likewise,	you	can	taste,	and	thus	be	aware	of,	an	under-peaty	Ardbeg	Uigeadail,	without	being	able	to	taste,	and	thus	be	aware,	that	this	is	an	Ardbeg	Uigeadail	and	an	under-peaty	one	at	that.	In	general,	then,	the	contents	of	thing-awareness	can	far	outstrip	the	concepts	one	possesses	–	whereas	the	contents	of	fact-awareness	are	constrained	by	what	concepts	one	has.	This	suggests	that	even	when	we	do	possess	the	concept	of	an	F,	in	being	thing-aware	of	an	F	we	do	not	deploy	this	concept.		
Direct	Expressibility.	Concept	possession	allows	for	direct	expression	in	public	language.	Thus	fact-awareness	enables	one	to	express	the	contents	of	one’s	awareness	(Dretske	1993:	266).ii	When	you	smell	that	the	toast	is	burning,	your	
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awareness	of	the	fact	that	the	toast	is	burning	might	compel	you	to	run	and	check	the	state	of	your	toast;	perhaps,	while	running,	you	might	even	cry	out	‘The	toast	is	burning!’	Being	thing-aware	of	the	burning	toast	does	not	have	such	effects	on	one’s	verbal	behavior.	For	one	thing,	if	you	are	unfortunate	enough	to	lack	the	concept	of	toast,	you	will	be	unable	to	express	the	content	of	your	thing-awareness	of	the	burning	toast.	You	may	still	be	able	to	say	‘Something’s	burning!,’	but	that	is	because	you	are	also	fact-aware	that	something	is	burning.	In	most	cases,	of	course,	we	do	possess	the	relevant	concepts	and	can	thus	give	voice	to	the	contents	of	our	thing-awareness.	But	arguably,	even	then	the	only	reason	we	can	do	so	is	that	our	possession	of	the	relevant	concepts	allows	us	to	form	rather	immediately	the	corresponding	fact-awareness.	For	example,	because	in	reality	you	do	possess	both	the	concepts	TOAST	and	BURNING,	your	thing-awareness	of	the	burning	toast	enables	you	to	immediately	form	the	fact-awareness	that	the	toast	is	burning,	which	in	turn	enables	you	to	assert	‘The	toast	is	burning.’	Here,	there	is	a	sense	in	which	the	content	of	your	thing-awareness	is	expressible,	but	indirectly:	its	expressibility	is	mediated	by	the	expressibility	of	your	fact-awareness’	content.	One	can	recognize	that	this	is	so	even	without	having	a	complete	analysis	of	the	difference	between	direct	and	indirect	expressibility.iii	Dretske	(1993:	266)	insists	that	thing-awareness	does	not	entail	fact-awareness:	S	can	be	(thing-)aware	of	a	even	if	S’s	awareness	is	not	a	propositional	attitude,	does	not	deploy	any	concept	associated	with	a,	and	does	not	impact	S’s	verbal	behavior	so	as	to	enable	direct	expression.	For	example,	you	can	see	(and	thus	be	thing-aware	of)	a	pyura	chilensis,	without	being	aware	that	it	is	a	pyura	
chilensis,	without	possessing	the	concept	of	pyura	chilensis,	and	without	being	able	to	express	what	you	see.iv		For	Dretske,	what	this	shows	is	that	thing-awareness	is	sufficient	for	conscious	awareness.	If	S	is	thing-aware	of	x,	then	S	is	in	a	conscious	state	of	some	sort	(1993:	270).	Accordingly,	lack	of	fact-awareness	does	not	entail	lack	of	consciousness	–	as	long	as	thing-awareness	is	present,	consciousness	is	as	well.	Thus,	when	you	see	a	pyura	chilensis,	your	visual	experience	has	a	distinctive	
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phenomenal	character,	even	though	you	are	not	aware	that	what	you	see	is	a	pyura	
chilensis.	One	might	wonder	whether	in	such	a	case	there	is	really	no	fact	you	are	aware	of	regarding	the	thing	you	see.	For	even	if	you	are	not	aware	that	what	you	see	is	a	pyura	chilensis,	you	might	be	aware	that	it	is,	say,	an	animal	of	some	sort,	or	at	least	an	entity	of	some	sort	–	that	you	see	something	rather	than	nothing.	Thus	one	might	object	that	there	is	at	least	one	concept,	namely	the	maximally	generic	concept	ENTITY,	that	is	necessarily	applied	by	a	subject	when	she	is	aware	of	something	(see	Dretske	1993:	268).v	However,	there	are	at	least	two	reasons	to	resist	this	requirement.	First,	whether	such	a	maximally	generic	concept	exists	is	controversial.	One	fundamental	function	of	concepts	is	to	divide	entities:	a	concept	F	separates	the	Fs	from	the	non-Fs.	But	a	concept	which	applies	to	everything	could	not	do	this.	Secondly,	it	is	doubtful	that	the	maximally	generic	concept	must	be	
possessed	by	animals	and	infants	in	order	for	them	to	be	aware	of	something	–	arguably,	animals	and	infants	do	not	possess	such	highly	abstract	concepts.vi	It	might	be	replied	that	infants	do	possess	another	kind	of	concept,	namely,	the	concept	of	a	thing	(a	material	object),	which	can	be	applied	to	the	objects	of	perception.	The	latter	is	a	highly	generic	concept,	though	not	maximally	generic	in	the	absolute	sense.	It	is	rather	what	one	might	call	a	perception-relative	maximally	
generic	concept:	it	is	the	maximally	generic	concept	that	can	be	applied	to	what	can	be	perceived.	However,	even	if	infants	possess	the	concept	of	a	thing,	it	seems	unlikely	that	they	apply	it	every	time	they	are	perceptually	aware	of	something.	It	would	seem,	then,	that	thing-awareness	does	not	require	application	of	concepts.	This	is	so	even	if	perception	is	theory-laden,	as	is	sometimes	claimed	(Hanson	1958).	If	perception	is	theory-laden,	then	it	is	nomically	impossible	for	us	to	perceive	without	applying	the	relevant	concepts	at	our	disposal.	What	this	alleged	theory-ladenness	of	perception	implies	is,	at	most,	that	thing-perception	and	fact-perception	are	nomically	inseparable.	That	is,	the	laws	of	nature	exclude	the	occurrence	of	thing-perception	in	the	absence	of	fact-perception.	Even	so,	however,	
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it	remains	that	the	two	are	conceptually	or	logically	distinguishable	components	or	aspects	of	perceptual	awareness.	Importantly,	the	notion	of	thing-awareness	is	not	particularly	committal	on	the	nature	of	‘things’	in	the	relevant	sense.	You	can	be	thing-aware	of	a	tree,	but	also	of	a	green	tree,	the	tree’s	greenness,	and	so	on.	Apparently,	any	kind	of	particular	might	qualify	as	a	‘thing’:	an	individual	substance	(the	tree),	a	property-instance	or	trope	(the	tree’s	greenness),	a	qua-object	(the	tree	qua	green),	and	so	on.vii	In	addition,	thing-awareness	is	not	supposed	to	be	restricted	to	physical	things.	As	we	now	turn	to	discuss,	different	kinds	of	mental	particular,	such	as	a	mental	event	or	conscious	episode,	might	also	be	the	target	of	thing-awareness.			
1.2.	Fact-Introspection	and	Thing-Introspection	As	noted,	Dretske	focuses	on	perceptual	awareness.	But	there	is	no	reason	his	distinction	could	not	apply	to	introspective	awareness	(Giustina	2015).	When	you	experience	hunger,	and	attend	to	your	experience,	you	may	be	(a)	introspectively	aware	of	your	hunger	or	(b)	introspectively	aware	that	you	are	hungry.	(Note	well:	throughout,	we	are	using	the	term	‘hunger’	not	for	the	bodily	event	but	for	the	corresponding	experience.)	The	same	two	kinds	of	report	are	available	here:	(3) You	introspect	your	hunger.	(4) You	introspect	that	you	are	hungry.	Our	claim	is	that,	here	too,	two	different	mental	states	are	reported.	We	label	these	‘thing-introspection’	and	‘fact-introspection.’viii	Our	claim	is	that	all	three	differences	between	thing-	and	fact-awareness	apply	also	to	thing-	and	fact-introspection:	thing-introspection	is	an	objectual	attitude,	which	does	not	deploy	concepts,	and	which	is	not	directly	expressible;	fact-introspection	is	a	propositional	attitude	that	deploys	concepts	and	is	directly	expressible.		 First,	fact-introspection	is	a	propositional	attitude,	whereas	thing-introspection	is	an	objectual	attitude.	When	you	introspect	that	you	are	hungry,	or	
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that	your	hunger	is	mild,	or	that	your	mild	hunger	is	not	as	bad	as	your	thirst,	the	content	of	your	introspective	state	is	always	a	proposition.	Thing-introspection	of	your	hunger,	by	contrast,	does	not	have	a	proposition	for	its	content,	but	an	individual	item.	Relatedly,	the	following	inference	is	valid:	you	introspect	your	hunger;	your	hunger	is	a	mild	hunger;	therefore,	you	introspect	your	mild	hunger.	In	contrast,	the	corresponding	inference	for	fact-introspection	is	clearly	invalid:	you	introspect	that	you	are	hungry;	your	hunger	is	a	mild	hunger;	therefore,	you	introspect	that	you	are	mildly	hungry.	If	you	pay	no	attention	to	the	intensity	of	your	hunger,	you	might	introspect	that	you	are	hungry	without	introspecting	that	your	hunger	is	mild.			 Secondly,	fact-introspection	involves	the	deployment	of	concepts,	whereas	thing-introspection	does	not.	It	is	impossible	to	introspect	that	one	is	hungry	without	possessing	the	concept	of	hunger.	Indeed,	the	concept	of	hunger	seems	to	be	a	constituent	of	the	propositional	content	<I	am	hungry>.	But	it	is	possible	for	us	to	thing-introspect	any	number	of	experiences	for	which	we	have	no	suitable	concepts.	Clear	examples	of	this	are	cases	in	which	we	have	certain	types	of	experience	(which	certain	types	of	characteristic	phenomenology)	for	the	first	time.	Consider	the	first	time	you	tasted	oyster,	or	vegemite;	the	first	time	you	smelled	durian;	the	first	time	you	felt	in	love,	or	felt	sexual	attraction.	In	all	these	cases,	you	were	able	to	thing-introspect	your	experience,	and	appreciate	its	peculiar	phenomenology	thereby,	but	without	possessing	the	relevant	concept.	Accordingly,	thing-introspection	does	not	inherently	require	concept-application.	So	even	when	you	later	do	acquire	the	concepts	OYSTER-TASTE,	DURIAN-SMELL,	etc.,	you	still	need	not	
deploy	them	in	order	to	thing-introspect	your	experiences.	To	that	extent,	thing-introspection	does	not	involve	classifying	or	categorizing	one’s	conscious	experience.	It	is	a	more	direct	awareness	of	the	experience	itself,	in	its	pure	phenomenal	appearance	so	to	speak.ix		 Thirdly,	if	you	introspect	that	your	hunger	is	mild,	then	typically	you	can	
describe	your	hunger	as	mild	on	the	basis	of	this	fact-introspection	of	it	–	describe	it	in	any	public	language	you	master	sufficiently	well.	In	doing	so,	you	would	be	
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expressing	the	contents	of	your	fact-introspection.	In	contrast,	thing-introspecting	your	mild	hunger	does	not	automatically	enable	you	to	express	what	you	are	introspecting.	This	may	be	hard	to	imagine	in	the	case	of	mild	hunger,	since	most	of	us	possess	the	concepts	HUNGER	and	MILD.	But	consider	an	episode	in	which	you	thing-introspect	a	subtle	olfactory	experience	of	an	unrecognized	scent.	You	can	
name	that	which	you	are	thing-introspecting	with	a	private	name,	but	you	cannot	describe	it	in	public	language	without	applying	concepts	to	it.	As	before,	when	you	do	possess	the	relevant	concepts,	as	in	the	case	of	HUNGER	and	MILD,	you	can	probably	express	that	which	you	thing-introspect,	but	arguably,	this	is	only	because	you	can	immediately	form	an	appropriate	fact-introspective	state	on	the	basis	of	your	thing-introspection.	Someone	who	thing-introspects	a	mild	hunger	and	who	possesses	the	concepts	HUNGER	and	MILD	is	in	a	position	to	transition	to	fact-introspecting	that	she	is	having	a	mild	hunger.	Arguably,	it	is	only	because	she	is	in	a	position	to	perform	this	transition	that	she	can	give	voice	to	the	contents	of	her	thing-introspection.	To	that	extent,	only	fact-introspection	is	directly	and	independently	expressible,	whereas	thing-introspection	is	expressible	merely	indirectly	and	dependently	on	the	availability	of	a	suitable	fact-introspection.		As	with	thing-	and	fact-awareness,	thing-introspection	does	not	entail	fact-introspection:	S	can	thing-introspect	her	concurrent	conscious	experience	even	if	S’s	awareness	is	not	a	propositional	attitude,	does	not	deploy	any	concepts	associated	with	her	experience,	and	does	not	enable	direct	expression.	As	before,	one	might	wonder	whether	one	can	introspect,	say,	one’s	pain	without	attending	it,	if	not	qua	pain,	at	least	qua	something,	say,	this	feeling.	In	other	words,	one	might	object	that	there	is	at	least	one	concept	–	the	concept	of	a	feeling	(or	an	experience)	–	that	must	be	applied	by	a	subject	when	she	introspects	her	current	conscious	experience.	The	latter	is	an	introspection-relative	maximally	generic	concept	in	the	same	sense	the	concept	of	a	material	object	is	a	perception-relative	maximally	generic	concept.	It	is	the	maximally	generic	concept	that	can	be	applied	to	what	is	introspected.	The	objector’s	claim	is	that	every	act	of	introspection	must	apply	at	least	this	concept	to	the	item	introspected.	However,	it	seems	unlikely	that	infants	and	animals	possess	
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such	an	introspection-relative	maximally	generic	concept,	though	it	is	also	unclear	whether	animals	and	infants	have	the	capacity	to	introspect.	More	importantly,	it	does	not	seem	that	people	necessarily	apply	such	a	concept	when	they	introspect,	even	when	they	possess	the	concept.	Moreover,	even	if	application	of	an	introspection-relative	maximally	generic	concept	turned	out	to	be	necessary	in	introspection,	this	would	not	immediately	threaten	the	thing-introspection/fact-introspection	distinction.	For	we	could	still	distinguish	between	two	kinds	of	introspection:	one	that	involves	only	the	application	of	such	maximally	generic	concepts,	and	another	that	also	involves	the	application	of	more	refined,	more	discriminating	concepts.	The	underlying	difference	between	introspective	acts	that	
classify	or	categorize	the	experiences	they	take	as	objects	and	those	that	do	not	would	survive.	In	that	case	only	the	articulation	of	the	thing-introspection/fact-introspection	distinction	would	have	to	change:	thing-introspection	would	be	any	introspective	act	in	which	either	no	concept	is	applied,	or	the	absolutely	maximally	generic	concept	ENTITY	is	applied,	or	the	introspection-relative	maximally	generic	concept	(FEELING	or	EXPERIENCE)	is.	We	are	inclined	to	think	that	thing-introspection	does	not	require	the	application	of	any	concept,	but	those	who	resist	need	not	deny	the	existence	of	thing-introspection	–	they	can	simply	adopt	this	modified	construal	of	it.	 Also	as	before,	the	thing-introspection/fact-introspection	distinction	is	consistent	with	the	notion	that	introspection	is	theory-laden,	a	notion	more	sparsely	embraced	than	its	perceptual	counterpart	but	not	without	precedent	(see	Churchland	1979).	If	introspection	is	theory-laden,	this	shows	at	most	that	it	is	nomically	impossible	for	us	to	undergo	thing-introspection	without	also	undergoing	fact-introspection;	still,	the	two	are	conceptually	or	logically	distinct	components	or	aspects	of	our	introspective	states.	Finally,	the	term	‘thing-introspection’	is	not	intended	to	prejudge	the	ontological	category	to	which	belongs	the	thing	introspected:	phenomenal	events,	phenomenal	states,	phenomenal	property-instances,	phenomenal	tropes,	phenomenal	episodes,	and	phenomenal	processes	are	all	eligible	referents	of	thing-introspection.		
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1.3.	Thing-Introspection,	Fact-Introspection,	and	Reliability	Our	main	contention	is	this:	typical	arguments	for	the	unreliability	of	introspection	target	only	fact-introspection,	leaving	the	presumed	reliability	of	thing-introspection	entirely	untouched.			 Obviously,	we	cannot	here	go	through	all	extant	arguments	for	introspective	unreliability.x	But	consider	by	way	of	example	Schwitzgebel’s	(2008)	compelling	observation	that	we	seem	unable	to	describe	in	any	detail	our	ongoing	phenomenal	experience.	Asking	us	to	introspect	our	current	emotional	experience,	he	writes:	
Is	it	completely	obvious	to	you	what	the	character	of	that	experience	is?	Does	introspection	reveal	it	to	you	as	clearly	as	visual	observation	reveals	the	presence	of	the	text	before	your	eyes?	Can	you	discern	its	gross	and	fine	features	through	introspection	as	easily	and	confidently	as	you	can,	through	vision,	discern	the	gross	and	fine	features	of	nearby	external	objects?	Can	you	trace	its	spatiality	(or	nonspatiality),	its	viscerality	or	cognitiveness,	its	involvement	with	conscious	imagery,	thought,	proprioception,	or	whatever,	as	sharply	and	infallibly	as	you	can	discern	the	shape,	texture,	and	color	of	your	desk?	(Schwitzgebel	2008:	251)	The	idea	is	that	we	would	be	able	to	answer	such	questions	with	reasonable	confidence	if	introspection	were	anywhere	near	as	reliable	a	belief-formation	method	as,	say,	vision	is.	Since	we	are	unable	to	answer	with	any	confidence,	introspection	must	in	fact	be	a	considerably	poorer	belief-formation	method.			 Note,	however,	that	answering	the	kinds	of	question	Schwitzgebel	lists	would	take	the	form	of	uttering	indicative	sentences	that	predicate	certain	phenomenal	properties	of	your	emotional	experience.	For	these	indicatives	to	express	the	content	of	the	mental	states	bringing	them	about,	the	two	would	have	to	share	the	same	type	of	content.	Therefore,	the	mental	states	in	question	would	have	to	predicate	certain	phenomenal	properties	of	your	emotional	experience.	This	makes	them	feature	all	the	hallmarks	of	fact-introspection.	First,	they	have	propositional	content,	since	the	indicatives	that	express	them	have	propositional	content.	Secondly,	they	have	conceptual	content,	since	the	predication	of	phenomenal	
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properties	just	is	the	application	of	corresponding	phenomenal	concepts.	Thirdly,	and	most	obviously,	the	mental	states	expressed	by	the	relevant	indicatives	are	directly	expressible.	Thus	the	introspective	shortcomings	highlighted	by	Schwitzgebel’s	barrage	of	questions	are	shortcomings	of	fact-introspection.	They	do	not	immediately	reflect	negatively	on	thing-introspection.			 It	might	be	objected	that	even	if	the	barrage	threatens	immediately	only	fact-introspection,	fact-introspection	itself	is	plausibly	formed	on	the	basis	of	thing-introspection.	If	so,	the	relevant	introspective	judgments	depend	ultimately	upon	thing-introspection,	so	our	inability	to	form	the	requisite	judgment	ultimately	reflects	negatively	on	thing-introspection	as	well.		In	response,	we	agree	that	fact-introspection	is	based	on	thing-introspection,	but	point	out	that	it	is	not	based	only	on	thing-introspection.	At	a	minimum,	fact-introspection	involves	also	the	categorization	or	classification	of	that	which	is	thing-introspected,	and	thereby,	the	application	of	a	concept	to	what	is	thing-introspected.	In	order	to	introspect	that	you	are	hungry,	for	example,	you	must	not	only	thing-introspect	your	hunger,	but	also	apply	the	concept	HUNGER	to	it.	Applying	the	concept	HUNGER	to	it	involves	classifying	it	with	other,	resembling	experiences	as	belonging	to	a	single	category	or	class	of	experiences,	some	(most!)	of	which	you	do	not	currently	thing-introspect.	It	is	only	such	application	of	a	concept,	implying	categorization	or	classification	of	the	thing-introspected	item,	that	allows	the	act	of	fact-introspection	to	have	a	conceptual	content.	And	such	conceptual	content	is	a	necessary	precondition	for	forming	a	directly	expressible	propositional	state.	One	cannot	come	to	entertain	the	proposition	<I	am	hungry>,	let	alone	fact-introspect	that	one	is	hungry,	without	applying	the	concept	of	hunger	to	the	item	one	is	aware	of.	The	application	of	the	concept	is	thus	necessary	for	forming	your	fact-introspection.xi			(Note	well:	although	the	categorization	process	may	be	temporally	extended,	it	need	not	be.	On	some	occasions,	you	may	first	thing-introspect	your	hunger,	reflect	upon	what	kind	of	experience	it	is,	and	quite	deliberately	decide	to	apply	
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HUNGER	to	it.	On	other	occasions,	fact-introspection	may	be	formed	instantaneously,	so	that	concepts	are	applied	to	the	thing-introspected	experience	immediately	and	
automatically.	Indeed,	this	appears	to	be	the	paradigmatic	case:	you	introspect	your	current	conscious	experience	and	directly	fact-introspect	that	you	are	hungry.	In	these	paradigmatic	cases,	the	thing-introspection	and	the	classification	process	may	occur	simultaneously,	as	one.xii	Nonetheless,	we	can	still	factorize	the	fact-introspective	state	into	a	thing-introspective	component	and	a	classificatory	component.	For	on	the	one	hand,	it	seems	impossible	to	fact-introspect	that	one	is	hungry	without	thing-introspecting	one’s	hunger,	and	on	the	other	hand,	thing-introspecting	one’s	hunger	does	not	suffice	for	fact-introspecting	that	one	is	hungry.)		The	question,	then,	is	whether	the	fact-introspective	shortcomings	brought	out	by	Schwitzgebel’s	line	of	questioning	emanate	from	shortcomings	(i)	of	thing-introspection,	(ii)	of	its	attendant	concept-application,	or	(iii)	of	both.	An	initial	consideration	that	suggests	(ii)	is	that	it	is	the	concept-application	involved	in	fact-introspection	that	takes	one	beyond	what	is	immediately	given	to	one	in	thing-introspection.	This	involves	an	implicit	commitment	to	a	similarity	between	what	is	given	in	thing-introspection	and	other	experiences	not	currently	thing-introspected.	In	addition,	however,	standard	cases	of	uncertain	or	erroneous	fact-introspection	seem	straightforwardly	traceable	to	misapplication	of	a	concept.		Consider	first	uncertain	fact-introspection.	In	some	cases,	you	might	be	dumbfounded	by	what	you	thing-introspect,	unable	for	a	while	to	apply	any	relevant	concept	to	it.	Suppose	you	pick	up	a	can	of	Orangina	which,	unbeknownst	to	you,	contains	high-quality	chocolate	milk.xiii	As	you	take	your	first	sip,	you	might	be	so	surprised	as	to	be	utterly	unable	to	apply	any	gustatory	concept	to	your	taste	experience.xiv	Nonetheless,	you	are	certainly	thing-introspectively	aware	of	the	phenomenal	character	of	that	experience.		In	other	cases,	you	might	change	your	mind	about	which	concept	is	most	appropriate	to	apply	to	your	experience.	As	the	dentist	drills	into	your	
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anaesthetized	tooth,	you	might	initially	classify	your	experience	as	a	dull	pain	and	only	later	come	to	realize	that	it	is	really	just	a	sensation	of	pressure	(Rosenthal	2005:	211).	Suppose	you	correctly	do	so.	Then	your	original	classification	of	your	experience	was	a	misclassification.	That	is,	your	fact-introspection	that	you	were	having	a	dull	pain	in	your	tooth	was	erroneous.	Crucially,	there	need	not	be	any	change	in	the	phenomenal	character	that	thing-introspection	presents	to	you	when	you	reclassify	your	experience	as	a	pressure	sensation	rather	than	a	dull	pain.	In	these	cases,	then,	the	error	and	uncertainty	in	fact-introspection	clearly	results	not	from	the	underlying	thing-introspection,	but	from	the	categorization	process	applied	to	it.	For	all	we	have	shown	here,	there	might	of	course	be	other	cases	in	which	it	is	less	transparent	whether	what	went	astray	was	the	original	thing-introspection	or	the	‘superimposed’	categorization.	Arguably,	however,	standard	arguments	for	the	unreliability	of	introspection	have	failed	to	provide	compelling	instances	of	erroneous	fact-introspection	in	which	the	error	is	clearly	traceable	to	wayward	thing-introspection,	rather	than	a	misclassification	or	miscategorization	thereof.		Obviously,	we	cannot	here	go	over	each	and	every	challenge	to	the	reliability	of	introspection	and	show	that	it	fails	to	challenge	specifically	the	reliability	of	thing-introspection.	But	we	enjoin	the	reader	to	think	of	the	standard	(or	for	that	matter	nonstandard!)	challenges	and	consider	for	herself	whether	the	problem	is	not	plausibly	traced	back	to	the	conceptualization,	classification,	or	categorization	of	the	thing-introspected	item,	rather	than	to	the	thing-introspecting	itself.	We	predict	that	normal	adult	human	thing-introspection	is	essentially	never	the	main	suspect	when	trying	to	explain	what	went	wrong	in	some	instance	of	mistaken	fact-introspection.	And	so	we	would	like	to	issue	the	following	challenge	to	critics	of	introspection:	
show	us	a	case	in	which	error	or	uncertainty	in	some	introspective	judgment	is	more	
plausibly	traceable	to	thing-introspection	than	to	the	attendant	concept-application.	If	this	challenge	cannot	be	met,	then	we	have	here	an	important	asymmetry	between	introspection	and	perception.	To	be	sure,	a	subject	may	seem	to	see	that	
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there	is	a	butterfly	before	her,	when	in	fact	there	is	not,	because	she	does	see	a	flying	creature	before	her	and	misapplies	the	concept	of	butterfly	to	it.	But	at	least	in	some	cases,	a	subject	may	seem	to	see	that	there	is	a	butterfly	before	her,	when	in	fact	there	is	not,	because	she	hallucinates	a	flying	creature	where	there	is	none	(indeed	where	there	is	nothing!).	Thus	both	failures	of	thing-perception	and	concept-application	may	underlie	failures	of	fact-perception.	However,	as	far	as	we	can	tell,	all	failures	of	fact-introspection	result	from	failures	of	concept-application.	In	the	next	section,	we	venture	an	explanation	of	this	asymmetry	between	thing-perception	and	thing-introspection.	If	all	this	is	right,	then	thing-introspection	is	plausibly	highly	reliable,	whatever	is	the	case	with	fact-introspection.	It	might	be	objected	that	the	very	notion	of	reliability	has	no	intelligible	application	for	such	a	‘thin’	phenomenon	as	thing-introspection.	Typically,	introspection	is	understood	as	a	reliable	process	when	it	leads	to	a	preponderance	of	true	beliefs.	But	beliefs	are	never	formed	by	thing-introspection	alone,	so	the	notion	of	a	reliable	thing-introspection	cannot	be	understood	in	this	way.	However,	a	refined	construal	of	reliability	is	still	applicable	here.	We	can	separate	the	different	processes	leading	to	the	formation	of	phenomenal	beliefs	and	ask	about	the	contribution	of	each	of	these	to	the	likelihood	that	the	ensuing	beliefs	be	true.	To	claim	that	thing-introspection	is	reliable,	in	this	picture,	is	to	say	that	when	beliefs	formed	partly	on	the	basis	of	thing-introspection	are	false,	it	is	preponderantly	not	because	of	the	contribution	of	thing-introspection	to	their	formation	that	they	are.xv		
2. Thing-Introspection	and	Inner	Awareness	
	We	have	argued	that	standard	challenges	to	the	reliability	of	introspection	do	not	seriously	put	in	question	the	reliability	of	thing-introspection.	In	other	words,	there	are	no	good	reasons	to	think	that	thing-introspection	is	unreliable.	But	are	there	positive	reasons	to	think	that	thing-introspection	is	reliable?	In	this	section,	we	offer	such	a	reason.	We	do	so	somewhat	dogmatically	and	speculatively:	we	assume	
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without	argument	a	certain	view	of	the	nature	of	phenomenal	consciousness,	according	to	which	the	occurrence	of	a	conscious	experience	requires	the	subject’s	inbuilt,	constitutive	awareness	of	the	experience	(§2.1);	we	then	offer	an	account	of	the	relationship	between	this	inbuilt	awareness	and	thing-introspection	that	suggests	the	latter	is	likely	infallible	(§2.2).	Our	claim	in	this	section	is	very	much	conditional,	then:	if	our	theoretical	framework	is	accepted,	then	thing-introspection	is	not	only	highly	reliable,	but	even	infallible.	We	close	this	section	with	further	speculation	regarding	potential	capacity	of	our	account	of	thing-introspection	to	vindicate	the	commonsense	claim	that	phenomenal	beliefs	are	reliably	formed	(§2.3).	We	suggest	that	this	might	be	a	point	in	the	theory’s	favor.		
2.1.	Consciousness	and	Inner	Awareness	According	to	David	Rosenthal	(1990),	conscious	states	are	states	we	are	conscious	
of:	in	order	to	have	a	conscious	pain	experience,	for	example,	I	must	be	aware	of	having	it.	Dretske	(1993)	opposes	this,	claiming	that	conscious	states	are	states	we	are	conscious	with,	not	conscious	of;	they	are	states	in	virtue	of	which	we	are	aware	of	our	external	environment,	though	we	may	be	completely	unaware	of	their	own	occurrence.	William	Lycan’s	(1996)	view	is	that	both	are	true:	conscious	states	are	state	we	are	both	conscious	of	and	conscious	with.	Ned	Block’s	view,	meanwhile,	is	that	neither	is	true:	sometimes	conscious	states	do	not	make	us	aware	of	anything	(Block	1996),	and	there	may	well	be	conscious	states	we	are	unaware	of	(Block	2007).	Let	us	call	awareness	of	the	external	environment	outer	awareness	and	awareness	of	one’s	own	conscious	states	inner	awareness.	Then	the	four	types	of	view	are	as	follows:xvi		
	 	
Inner	Awareness	
	
No	Inner	Awareness	
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Outer	Awareness	
	 Lycan	 	 Dretske	
	
No	Outer	Awareness	
	 Rosenthal	 	 Block	
	
Table	1.	Modern	theories	of	consciousness:	A	taxonomy	
What	is	common	to	the	Rosenthal-	and	Lycan-style	views	is	that	both	insist	that	a	conscious	state	cannot	occur	without	the	subject	having	inner	awareness	of	its	occurrence.	The	claim	has	an	illustrious	history:	Aristotle	writes	that	‘knowing,	perceiving,	believing,	and	thinking	are	always	of	something	else,	but	of	themselves	on	the	side	(en	parergo)’	(Metaphysics	12.9,	1074b35-6);	Locke	asserts	that	‘Whilst	[the	soul]	thinks	and	perceives	…	it	must	necessarily	be	conscious	of	its	own	Perceptions’	(ECHU	2.1.12).	We	are	well	aware	that	the	view	is	not	uncontroversial,	but	will	assume	it	henceforth.			 The	view	that	conscious	experiences	involve	inner	awareness	of	their	own	occurrence	comes	in	two	main	varieties.	According	to	‘higher-order	theory,’	subject	
S	is	aware	of	her	experience	E	in	virtue	of	being	in	a	numerically	distinct	mental	state	M	(Rosenthal	1990).	According	to	‘self-representationalism,’	S	is	aware	of	E	in	virtue	of	being	in	E	itself	(Kriegel	2009).	Another	way	to	put	the	difference	is	the	following.	When	S	is	aware	of	E,	S	must	be	in	mental	state	M,	which	constitutes	the	awareness	of	E.	According	to	higher-order	theory,	M	≠	E;	according	to	self-representationalism,	M	=	E.	That	is,	both	views	require	inner	awareness	of	one’s	conscious	state,	but	only	self-representationalism	demands	that	this	inner	awareness	be	built	into	the	conscious	state	itself.	Again	dogmatically,	we	are	going	to	adopt	here	self-representationalism,	thus	construing	the	inner	awareness	of	our	conscious	states	as	an	inbuilt	awareness.	
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	 Self-representationalism	itself	can	come	in	various	forms.	One	crucial	difference	is	between,	on	the	one	hand,	views	according	to	which	a	conscious	state’s	self-representation	attempts	to	track	or	detect	that	state’s	phenomenal	properties	and,	on	the	other	hand,	views	according	to	which	the	state’s	self-representation	
determines	or	constitutes	its	phenomenal	properties.	The	two	views	can	be	separated	by	the	following	Euthyphro-style	question:	when	a	normal	conscious	state	is	phenomenally	reddish	and	represents	itself	to	be	phenomenally	reddish,	does	it	represent	itself	as	phenomenally	reddish	because	it	is	phenomenally	reddish	or	is	it	phenomenally	reddish	precisely	because	it	represents	itself	as	phenomenally	reddish?	The	self-detection	view	accounts	for	the	content	of	a	state’s	self-representation	in	terms	of	that	state’s	phenomenal	properties,	while	the	self-determination	view	accounts	for	the	phenomenal	properties	in	terms	of	the	content	of	self-representation.	Only	on	the	second	view	is	inner	awareness	of	an	experience	
constitutive	of	the	experience’s	phenomenal	character.xvii	Here	too,	we	are	going	to	adopt	without	argument	the	second,	self-determination	view,	hence	construe	inner	awareness	as	constitutive.			 In	summary,	the	view	of	phenomenal	consciousness	we	are	adopting	here	has	three	crucial	aspects:	it	construes	all	conscious	states	as	involving	inner	awareness	of	their	occurrence,	it	construes	the	inner	awareness	as	built	into	those	conscious	states,	and	it	construes	the	phenomenal	properties	of	the	conscious	state	as	constituted	by	the	way	one	is	inner-aware	of	it.	On	this	view,	then,	for	a	subject	S	to	have	a	conscious	experience	E	with	phenomenal	property	F	is	for	S	to	have	a	constitutive	inbuilt	inner	awareness	of	E	as	F.	For	want	of	space,	we	have	defended	no	part	of	this	view	here,	but	see	Kriegel	2009	Ch.4	for	a	sustained	argument	for	it.			
2.2.	Inner	Awareness	and	Thing-Introspection	Higher-order	theories	have	a	straightforward	model	of	thing-introspection.	Recall	that	for	the	higher-order	theorist,	S	has	a	conscious	experience	E	iff	(i)	S	has	E	and	(ii)	S	has	a	(suitable)	higher-order	state	M	that	represents	E.	To	avoid	infinite	
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regress,	higher-order	theories	construe	M	as	a	typically	unconscious	state.	What	happens	when	S	introspects	E,	however,	is	that	S	is	consciously	representing	E,	so	that	M	becomes	itself	conscious.	In	order	for	M	to	be	conscious,	S	must	have	a	third-order	state	R	that	represents	M.	Accordingly,	for	the	higher-order	theorist,	thing-introspection	involves	the	concurrence	of	three	distinct	mental	states:	the	first-order	conscious	experience	E,	the	second-order	conscious	introspecting	M,	and	the	third-order	unconscious	state	R	(see	Rosenthal	1990).	Call	this	the	three-state	model	of	thing-introspection	(see	Figure	1).xviii	
	
Figure	1.	The	three-state	model	of	thing-introspection			 Self-representationalism	can	offer	two	different	accounts	of	thing-introspection.	One	option	is	to	construe	thing-introspection	as	a	second-order	conscious	state	M	that,	on	the	one	hand,	represents	the	first-order	experience	E	(this	is	what	makes	M	introspective),	and	on	the	other	hand,	represents	itself	(this	is	what	makes	M	conscious).	On	this	model,	thing-introspecting	an	experience	involves	the	occurrence	of	two	numerically	distinct	states:	the	first-order	conscious	experience,	which	represents	both	itself	and	some	external	object,	and	the	second-order	
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introspective	state,	which	represents	both	itself	and	the	first-order	state.	Call	this	the	two-state	model	of	thing-introspection	(see	Figure	2).	
	
Figure	2.	The	two-state	model	of	thing-introspection			 Another	option	is	to	construe	an	introspective	state	as	structurally	identical	to	a	regular,	non-introspective	conscious	state,	differing	only	in	respect	of	the	distribution	of	a	certain	resource,	which	we	may	call	attention.	On	this	view,	a	regular	conscious	experience	of	a	green	tree	represents	both	the	green	tree	and	itself,	but	does	so	with	a	certain	characteristic	distribution	of	attention:	most	of	one’s	attention	is	dedicated	to	the	tree,	and	only	a	small	amount	is	dedicated	to	the	seeing	of	the	tree.	What	happens	in	thing-introspection	is	that	this	standard	attention	distribution	is	reversed:	most	of	one’s	attention	is	dedicated	to	one’s	seeing	of	the	tree,	and	a	smaller	amount	to	the	tree	(Kriegel	2009	Ch.5).	Consider	this	toy	model:	at	t1,	S	is	absorbed	with	a	spectacular	sunset,	so	that	S’s	experience	E	represents	the	sunset	with	80%	of	S’s	attentional	resources	and	represents	itself	with	20%	of	S’s	attentional	resources;	at	t2,	the	sublime	sunset	has	put	S	in	an	introspective	mood,	so	that	E	now	represents	the	sunset	with	20%	of	S’s	attentional	resources	and	itself	with	80%	of	S’s	attentional	resources.	On	this	view,	the	introspective	state	is	the	same	old	first-order	experience,	but	having	undergone	a	
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shift	in	attention	distribution.	Call	this	the	one-state	model	of	thing-introspection	(see	Figure	3,	where	relative	arrow	breadth	stands	for	degree	of	attentiveness).		
	
	
Figure	3.	The	one-state	model	of	thing-introspection			 In	§2.1,	we	determined	to	adopt	a	self-representational	account	of	consciousness.	We	therefore	set	aside	the	three-state	model	of	thing-introspection,	which	flows	rather	from	the	higher-order	theory.	In	addition,	however,	we	find	at	least	two	reasons	to	prefer	the	one-state	over	two-state	model.		First,	if	the	two-state	model	were	correct,	a	subject	would	be	aware	twice	
over	of	all	her	thing-introspected	conscious	states:	once	in	virtue	of	those	states	representing	themselves	and	once	in	virtue	of	those	states	being	higher-order	represented.xix	Clearly,	however,	we	do	not	experience	ourselves	as	doubly	aware	of	our	thing-introspected	states.	Now,	granted,	the	two-state	proponent	might	be	able	to	devise	some	story	to	explain	why	we	experience	a	single	awareness	of	our	thing-introspected	states	(perhaps	the	two	awarenesses	are	somehow	‘fused’?).	It	is	noteworthy,	however,	that	the	one-state	model	does	not	require	any	further	complications	of	this	sort.			 Secondly,	the	two-state	model	involves	a	measure	of	cognitive	overkill.	Since	we	must	posit	attention	to	account	for	independent	phenomena	anyway	(those	phenomena	studied	by	attention	psychologists),	the	one-state	model	requires	no	new	and	special	posits	to	account	for	thing-introspection.	The	cognitive	architecture	posited	by	the	two-state	model	is	thus	needlessly	cumbersome.xx	
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	 For	these	reasons,	we	hereby	adopt	the	one-state	model	of	thing-introspection	within	the	self-representational	framework.	A	crucial	feature	of	this	model	is	that	introspective	awareness	is	the	same	old	constitutive,	inbuilt	awareness	that	(according	to	self-representationalism)	every	conscious	state	involves,	though	properly	augmented	with	additional	attention	resources.	This	means	that	thing-introspection,	too,	is	constitutive	and	inbuilt.	That	is,	it	is	(i)	built	into	the	very	thing-introspected	state	and	is	(ii)	constitutive	of	that	state’s	phenomenal	properties.	xxi	Here	we	want	to	focus	on	the	second	feature.	Recall	that	on	the	view	we	have	adopted	here,	an	experience	is	phenomenally	reddish	just	if	it	represents	itself	as	phenomenally	reddish;	indeed,	it	is	in	virtue	of	representing	itself	as	phenomenally	reddish	that	it	is	phenomenally	reddish.	In	unintrospected	experiences,	this	self-representation	is	nonattentive.	In	thing-introspected	ones,	it	is	attentive.	That	is,	for	one	to	thing-introspect	one’s	experience	as	phenomenally	reddish	just	is	for	one’s	experience	to	represent	itself	attentively	as	phenomenally	reddish.	Since	this	self-representation	of	itself	as	phenomenally	reddish	is	constitutive	of	the	experience’s	phenomenal	character,	thing-introspection,	somewhat	trivially,	cannot	get	the	phenomenal	character	wrong.			 What	this	means	is	that	thing-introspection	is	in	some	sense	infallible,	though	no	thanks	to	any	special	cognitive	achievement.	To	make	the	point	clear,	let	us	distinguish	between	de	facto	infallibility	and	de	jure	infallibility.	A	type	of	representation	is	de	facto	infallible	when	it	targets	an	independent	domain	of	facts	and	manages	always	and	necessarily	to	represent	those	facts	correctly.	In	contrast,	a	type	of	representation	is	de	jure	infallible	when	the	domain	of	phenomena	it	represents	has	no	independent	existence	–	the	facts	are	fixed	by	how	they	are	represented	by	the	relevant	representations.	It	is	an	open	question	in	our	minds	whether	de	facto	infallibility	is	a	real	phenomenon;	there	is	certainly	something	mysterious	about	the	idea	that	a	certain	cognitive	tool	has	reached	such	absolute	perfection	as	to	guarantee	the	exclusive	production	of	correct	representations.	Our	present	claim,	however,	is	that	thing-introspection	is	de	jure	infallible.		
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	 This	claim	falls	out	of	the	combination	of	two	theories.	The	first	is	the	theory	of	consciousness	according	to	which	all	conscious	states	necessarily	involve	a	constitutive	inbuilt	awareness;	we	have	offered	no	argument	for	this	view.	The	second	theory	is	that	a	conscious	state’s	thing-introspection	is	the	same	old	constitutive	inbuilt	awareness,	but	properly	augmented	with	attention	resources;	we	have	offered	some	reasons	for	preferring	this	to	the	other	model	of	thing-introspection	consistent	with	our	adoptive	theory	of	consciousness.	Strictly	speaking,	then,	we	have	only	argued	for	the	following	conditional	thesis:	if	one	adopts	our	favored	version	of	self-representationalism,	then	there	are	good	reasons	to	think	that	thing-introspection	is	(de	jure)	infallible.			
2.3.	Phenomenal-Belief	Formation		The	above	discussion	suggests	a	certain	picture	of	one	central	way	a	normal	adult	human	can	form	phenomenal	beliefs.	To	a	first	approximation,	such	phenomenal-belief	formation	involves	four	distinct	stages:	[1]		Subject	S	enjoys	constitutive	inbuilt	awareness	of	the	phenomenal	properties	of	her	concurrent	conscious	experience	E;	[2]		S	thing-introspects	E’s	phenomenal	property-instances;	[3]		S	fact-introspects	that	E	has	such-and-such	phenomenal	properties;	[4]		S	believes	that	E	has	such-and-such	phenomenal	properties.	Below,	we	offer	some	preliminary	and	somewhat	speculative	remarks	on	the	transitions	from	[1]	to	[2],	from	[2]	to	[3],	and	from	[3]	to	[4].	Inevitably,	we	will	leave	an	enormous	amount	of	detail	open.	We	hope	to	work	out	some	of	the	details	in	future	work.		 We	have	already	suggested	in	§2.2	what	is	involved	in	passing	from	[1]	to	[2],	that	is,	from	inner	awareness	to	thing-introspection	–	namely,	a	shift	in	attention.	In	a	typical	conscious	experience,	several	objects	are	represented,	but	only	one	is	attended	to.	Your	current	experience	probably	involves	attentive	visual	awareness	of	
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this	paper	you	are	reading,	but	also	various	forms	of	nonattentive	awareness:	nonattentive	visual	awareness	of	items	in	the	periphery	of	your	visual	field,	such	as	a	desk	and	a	book	stack;	nonattentive	auditory	awareness	of	footsteps	in	the	hallway	outside	your	office;	nonattentive	tactile	awareness	of	the	soles	of	your	shoes,	and	so	on.	If	we	are	right,	then	one	of	these	elements	is	nonattentive	inner	awareness	of	your	conscious	experience	itself.	Thing-introspecting	your	experience	involves	just	‘rearranging’	your	attentional	structure	so	that	you	become	attentively	aware	of	the	experience	itself	and	nonattentively	aware	of	the	paper	you	are	reading.		We	have	argued	in	§2.2	that	such	thing-introspection	is	infallible,	because	how	it	presents	the	phenomenal	properties	of	the	introspected	experience	is	constitutive	of	what	phenomenal	properties	the	experience	has.			 As	for	the	transition	from	thing-introspection	to	fact-introspection,	as	noted	in	§1.2,	the	crucial	element	is	the	classification	or	categorization	of	what	one	thing-introspects.	This	is	accomplished	through	the	application	of	a	concept	to	the	thing-introspected	experience.	For	example,	to	form	a	fact-introspective	state	on	the	basis	of	thing-introspection	of	one’s	hunger,	one	must	apply	the	concept	HUNGER	to	one’s	thing-introspected	hunger.	On	one	view,	this	is	all	that	is	required	to	form	a	fact-introspective	state	with	the	content	<this	is	hunger>	(or	<this	is	a	hunger	experience>).	On	another	view,	the	formation	of	such	a	fact-introspective	state	is	more	complicated,	and	requires	three	independent	mental	acts:	(i)	the	application	of	the	demonstrative	concept	THIS	to	one’s	experience,	(ii)	the	application	of	the	descriptive	concept	HUNGER	to	the	same,	and	(iii)	the	performance	of	a	further	mental	act,	‘predication,’	whereby	the	concepts	THIS	and	HUNGER	are	‘united’	in	the	state’s	propositional	content.			 It	is	typically	at	this	stage	–	in	the	transition	from	[2]	to	[3]	–	that	infallibility	is	lost.	If	S	is	classifying	her	hunger	not	as	a	hunger,	but	as	a	tickle,	then	S	has	misclassified	her	hunger.	In	doing	so,	she	has	implicitly	committed	to	a	false	proposition:	that	the	experience	she	is	thing-introspecting	is	a	member	of	kind	K	(when	in	fact	it	is	not),	or	that	it	resembles	S’s	tickle	experiences	more	than	it	does	
  26	
S’s	hunger	experiences	(when	in	fact	the	opposite	is	true).	Typically,	then,	the	concept	deployment	involved	in	the	transition	to	fact-introspection	introduces	the	possibility	of	error.	There	may	be	quite	unusual	concepts	that	do	not	introduce	this	possibility.	David	Chalmers	maintains	that	we	have	concepts	that	simply	name	the	phenomenal	property-instance	we	are	directly	aware	of	while	we	are	directly	aware	of	it,	that	go	out	of	existence	as	soon	the	property-instance	does,	and	whose	content	is	constituted	by	the	relevant	property-instance;	he	calls	these	‘direct	pure	phenomenal	concepts’	(Chalmers	2003:	235).	If	there	are	such	concepts,	then	perhaps	when	S	thing-introspects	a	phenomenal	property-instance	and	applies	to	it	such	a	concept,	S	cannot	fall	into	error.	In	like	fashion,	suppose	that	in	addition	to	the	demonstrative	concept	THIS,	which	simply	demonstrates	one’s	experience,	we	have	a	demonstrative	concept	LIKE	THAT,	which	merely	demonstrates	the	kind	of	phenomenal	quality	we	are	thing-introspectively	aware	of.	Then	on	the	basis	of	thing-introspecting	a	phenomenal	episode	of	ours,	we	can	always	form	a	fact-introspective	state	whose	content	is	<this	is	like	that>.	It	is	an	open	question	in	our	minds	whether	such	a	fact-introspective	state	is	susceptible	to	error;	there	are	good	reasons	to	think	it	is	not	(Giustina	2015).	If	so,	some	fact-introspection	may	yet	be	infallible.	Nonetheless,	for	the	great	majority	of	fact-introspective	states,	infallibility	is	not	in	the	cards.	Contrary	to	a	certain	Cartesian	tradition,	fact-introspecting	that	you	are	hungry,	that	you	have	a	headache,	that	you	are	sad,	or	that	you	are	angry	are	all	susceptible	to	error.	At	the	same	time,	it	would	be	quite	surprising	if	fact-introspection	were	not	on	the	whole	quite	reliable.	After	all,	it	is	based	on	thing-introspection,	which	is	infallible,	plus	a	relatively	modest	cognitive	act	of	concept-application.			 How	about	the	transition	from	[3]	to	[4]	–	say,	from	fact-introspecting	that	you	feel	hungry	to	believing	that	you	feel	hungry?	Consider,	by	analogy,	perceiving	that	the	table	is	brown	and	the	belief	directly	based	on	it.	This	kind	of	transition	does	not	seem	to	involve	any	inference.	Instead,	it	involves	taking	the	perceptual	appearances	at	face	value,	that	is,	committing	to	things	really	being	the	way	they	perceptually	seem	to	be.	We	might	call	this	kind	of	operation	endorsement.	The	idea,	
  27	
then,	is	that	believing	that	the	table	is	brown	can	be	formed	on	the	basis	of	endorsing	one’s	perception	that	the	table	is	brown.xxii	Crucially,	endorsement	is	
content-preserving:	one	can	form	a	belief	by	endorsement	only	if	the	content	of	one’s	belief	is	identical	to	the	content	of	the	endorsed	state	(in	this	case,	the	perception	that	the	table	is	brown).	Consider	the	following	contrast.	Suppose	you	see	in	northern	Mexico	many	systems	of	long	tunnels	with	nesting	chambers	at	their	end,	in	which	you	find	pure	white	eggs.	Given	sufficient	background	knowledge,	you	could	infer	from	this	that	there	are	Burrowing	Owls	living	in	the	area.	In	this	case,	you	form	the	belief	that	there	are	Burrowing	Owls	in	the	area	on	the	basis	of	perceiving	that	there	are	Burrowing-Owl-type	nests	in	the	area.	But	on	the	same	basis	you	could	also	form	the	more	cautious	belief	that	there	are	Burrowing-Owl-
type	nests	in	the	area.	More	generally,	a	belief	that	p	may	be	based	on	perception	in	one	of	two	ways:	either	it	is	arrived	at	by	inference	from	the	perception	that	q	or	it	may	be	formed	by	endorsement	of	a	perception	that	p.	The	belief	can	be	justifiably	formed	either	way,	but	it	is	formed	through	a	different	operation	in	each	case.	Now,	just	as	certain	perceptual	beliefs	can	be	formed	by	endorsing	perception-that,	certain	introspective	beliefs	can	be	formed	by	endorsement	of	introspection-that.	One	can	form	the	belief	that	one	is	hungry	by	simply	endorsing	the	fact-introspection	that	one	is	hungry.	In	doing	so,	one	would	only	be	committing	to	things	really	being	the	way	they	introspectively	seem	to	be.	That	is,	one	would	be	taking	the	introspective	appearances	at	face	value.			 Endorsing	appearances	introduces	further	possibilities	of	error.	Looking	at	a	Müller-Lyer	arrow,	most	of	us	will	(mis)perceive	that	one	arrow	is	longer	than	the	other,	but	will	refrain	from	endorsing	our	perceptual	experience.	In	doing	so,	we	correctly	refuse	to	take	the	appearances	at	face	value.	If	S	does	endorse	her	misperception	of	one	arrow	being	longer	than	the	other,	she	will	have	formed	a	false	belief.	Thus	endorsement	may	lead	to	false	belief.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	noteworthy	that	on	the	whole	endorsement	is	a	much	safer	operation	than	inference.	If	one	correctly	perceives	that	there	are	Burrowing-Owl-type	nests	around,	one	is	much	likelier	to	fall	into	error	by	coming	to	believe	that	there	are	Burrowing	Owls	around	
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(through	inference)	than	by	coming	to	believe	that	there	are	Burrowing-Owl-type	nests	around	(through	endorsement).	Obviously,	the	added	epistemic	risk	has	a	
point,	insofar	as	it	expands	one’s	knowledge.	Nonetheless,	other	things	being	equal	an	endorsement-formed	belief	that	p	is	more	likely	to	be	true,	and	is	thus	more	epistemically	justified,	than	an	inferentially	formed	belief	that	p.	To	that	extent,	beliefs	formed	on	the	basis	of	endorsing	fact-introspection	are,	other	things	being	equal,	more	epistemically	justified	than	beliefs	formed	on	the	basis	of	inference	from	fact-introspection.	Since	phenomenal	beliefs	are	typically	formed	by	endorsement	rather	than	inference,	they	constitute	a	particularly	secure	kind	of	belief.			 Much	more	remains	to	be	said	by	way	of	filling	in	this	model	of	the	formation	of	(some)	phenomenal	beliefs.	Already	this	preliminary	sketch,	however,	suggests	an	important	point,	namely,	that	phenomenal	beliefs	are	noninferential.	After	all,	their	formation	relies	on	the	cognitive	operations	of	(i)	attention-shifting,	(ii)	categorization	or	concept-application,	and	(iii)	endorsement,	but	not	on	any	
inferential	operation	(deductive,	inductive,	abductive,	or	other).		This	point	is	in	the	first	instance	psychological:	it	concerns	how	phenomenal	beliefs	are	actually	formed	(at	least	sometimes,	perhaps	typically).	But	it	also	has	
epistemic	significance:	it	has	implications	for	how	justified	such	phenomenal	beliefs	typically	are.	If	these	phenomenal	beliefs	are	ultimately	based	on	inner	awareness,	and	are	based	on	it	noninferentially,	then	they	are	ultimately	based	on	infallible	foundations,	and	are	based	on	them	through	operations	that	are	on	the	whole	safer	than	inference	(they	involve	a	lower	susceptibility	to	the	introduction	of	error).	If	so,	then	while	phenomenal	beliefs	are	not	themselves	infallible,	those	of	them	which	are	based	on	the	formation	process	sketched	here	are	likely	the	most	secure	beliefs	
we	have.xxiii	(More	accurately,	they	are	likely	the	most	secure	empirical	beliefs	we	have;	certain	a	priori	beliefs,	such	as	the	belief	in	the	law	of	contradiction,	may	be	even	more	secure.)	
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Conclusion	
	We	have	set	to	defend	the	reliability	of	introspection	against	the	skeptical	challenge	by	pointing	at	an	often	neglected	phenomenon,	thing-introspection,	and	showing	the	psychological	and	epistemic	consequences	of	our	account	of	it.	We	have	argued	that	thing-introspection	has	not	been	shown	to	be	unreliable,	and	may	even	be	infallible.	Our	defense	comprises	a	negative	component	and	a	positive	component.			 The	negative	component	addresses	skeptical	arguments	against	the	reliability	of	phenomenal	beliefs.	The	general	form	of	those	arguments	tends	to	be	this:	phenomenal	beliefs	are	ultimately	based	on	introspection;	introspection	is	unreliable;	therefore,	phenomenal	beliefs	are	unreliable.	We	have	argued	that	such	arguments	only	target	fact-introspection,	and	leave	the	question	of	the	reliability	thing-introspection	untouched.	If	error	occurs	in	fact-introspection,	then	it	is	more	likely	not	due	to	a	flaw	in	introspection	proper,	but	rather	to	miscategorization.		 The	positive	component	of	our	defense	is	grounded	in	a	certain	view	of	phenomenal	consciousness,	according	to	which	the	occurrence	of	a	conscious	experience	requires	the	subject’s	inbuilt,	constitutive	awareness	of	the	experience.	By	consequence,	our	positive	claim	is	a	conditional	one:	if	our	theoretical	framework	is	accepted,	then	thing-introspection	is	not	only	reliable,	but	quite	likely	infallible.	We	have	suggested	that	our	account	of	thing-introspection	allows	for	a	model	of	phenomenal-belief	formation	process	which	could	pave	the	way	for	a	defense	of	phenomenal	beliefs.	Arguably,	that	our	phenomenal	beliefs	are	typically	justified	is	an	article	of	common	sense.	To	that	extent,	it	is	a	strength	of	any	theory	of	belief	formation	that	it	vindicates	the	notion	that	phenomenal	beliefs	are	typically	justified.		 It	must	be	pointed	out,	however,	that	our	discussion	does	not	quite	defeat	skeptical	arguments	about	phenomenal	beliefs.	For	we	have	only	argued	for	the	claim	that	thing-introspection	is	highly	reliable	(and	may	turn	out	to	be	infallible).	We	have	not	shown	that	the	attendant	categorizing	process	leading	from	thing-
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introspection	to	fact-introspection	and	the	phenomenal	belief	is	reliable.	Therefore,	we	have	not	demonstrated	that,	contrary	to	what	skeptics	argue,	phenomenal	beliefs	are	on	the	whole	justified.	Nevertheless,	the	proposed	model	of	phenomenal-belief	formation	process	might	lay	the	basis	for	a	more	developed	defense	of	the	reliability	of	phenomenal	beliefs.	We	hope	to	pursue	this	wider	project	in	future	work.		 Our	discussion	has	important	implications	for	both	psychology	and	epistemology.	Regarding	the	former,	since	the	demise	of	introspectionist	psychology	about	a	century	ago,	introspection	has	been	considered	illegitimate	in	psychological	inquiry.	And	appeal	to	introspection	does	raise	a	number	of	genuine	issues,	in	particular	as	concerns	replicability	and	peer	disagreement	(Watson	1913,	Bayne	and	Spener	2010).	If	we	are	right,	however,	then	modulo	these	issues,	at	the	core	of	introspection	is	a	phenomenon	which	is	fundamentally	trustworthy,	one	it	might	be	foolish	to	leave	entirely	unexploited.		 As	for	epistemology,	our	discussion	may	offer	new	support	for	a	certain	traditional	version	of	foundationalism.	On	the	view	we	have	in	mind,	all	inferentially	justified	beliefs	are	justified	in	virtue	of	being	correctly	inferred	from	
noninferentially	justified	beliefs,	and	noninferentially	justified	beliefs	come	in	only	two	varieties	–	beliefs	about	one’s	ongoing	conscious	experience	and	certain	a	priori	beliefs.	Traditionally,	these	foundational	beliefs	were	construed	as	infallible	(BonJour	2001).	Such	foundationalism	has	faced	two	paramount	challenges:	to	show	how	noninferential	justification	is	possible,	and	to	fend	off	challenges	to	the	infallibility	of	beliefs	about	one’s	ongoing	conscious	experience.	Our	discussion	suggests	a	fairly	developed	model	of	the	noninferential	justification	involved	in	phenomenal	beliefs,	thus	potentially	addressing	the	first	challenge.xxiv	As	regards	the	second	challenge,	our	discussion	can	be	seen	as	recommending	moving	away	from	the	claim	that	phenomenal	beliefs	are	infallible	to	the	more	modest	claim	that	phenomenal	beliefs	are	the	most	secure	we	have;	this	latter	claim	seems	sufficient	to	justify	treating	them	as	foundational,	especially	given	that	they	are	noninferentially	justified.xxv	
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																																																									i	One	more	specification	is	needed	to	home	in	on	the	beliefs	we	are	interested	in	against	the	background	of	reductive	physicalism.	According	to	reductive	physicalism,	every	phenomenal	property	is	identical	to	some	physical	property.	Wearing	a	top-shelf	cerebroscope	connected	to	an	information	processing	system,	one	might	form	beliefs	about	physical	properties	of	one’s	concurrent	brain	states	that	are	in	fact	phenomenal	properties.	This	kind	of	belief	is	not,	however,	the	kind	of	belief	we	are	interested	in.	So	for	a	reductive	physicalist,	we	propose	that	a	phenomenal	belief	be	construed	as	a	belief	about	the	phenomenal	properties	of	one’s	concurrent	conscious	states	under	a	
phenomenal	description	(or	presented	under	a	phenomenal	mode	of	presentation).	For	the	sake	of	simplicity,	we	will	ignore	this	further	specification	in	what	follows.			ii	As	noted,	concept	possession	is	necessary	for	language	expression.	Thus,	what	is	fundamental	to	fact-awareness	is	application	of	concepts	–	enabling	language	expression	is	a	derivative	feature.	However,	stressing	direct	expressibility	helps	to	understand	what	kind	of	concepts	are	deployed	in	fact-awareness.	Dretske	himself	seems	to	suggest	this:	‘Generally	speaking,	the	concepts	necessary	for	awareness	of	facts	are	those	corresponding	to	terms	occurring	obliquely	in	the	clause	(the	that-clause)	describing	the	fact	one	is	aware	of.’	(1993:	265,	fn	8)		iii	It	might	be	argued	that,	in	fact,	thing-awareness	is	directly	expressible	in	public	language:	a	subject	who	has	the	concept	TOAST,	and	is	aware	of	a	toast,	can	directly	express	her	thing-awareness	simply	by	saying	‘toast,’	even	if	she	is	not	aware	of	any	fact	concerning	the	toast.	However,	in	this	case	what	is	directly	expressed	is	not	the	subject’s	thing-awareness	of	the	toast,	but	rather	her	fact-awareness	that	what	she	is	aware	of	is	a	toast	(i.e.,	the	concept	TOAST	applies	to	it).		iv	Here	is	how	Dretske	(1993:	266)	puts	it:	‘Ignorance	of	what	armadillos	are	or	how	they	look	may	prevent	someone	from	being	conscious	of	certain	facts	(that	the	object	crossing	the	road	is	an	armadillo)	without	impairing	in	the	slightest	one’s	awareness	of	the	things	–	the	armadillos	crossing	roads	–	that	(so	to	speak)	constitute	these	facts.’		v	Dretske	himself	is	aware	of	this	possible	objection:	‘One	can,	to	be	sure,	see	armadillos	without	seeing	that	they	are	armadillos,	but	perhaps	one	must,	in	order	to	see	them,	see	that	they	are	(say)	animals	of	some	sort.	[...]	If	this	sounds	implausible	(one	can	surely	mistake	an	animal	for	a	rock	or	a	bush)	maybe	one	must,	in	seeing	an	object,	at	least	see	that	it	is	an	object	of	some	sort.	To	be	aware	of	
  33	
																																																																																																																																																																					a	thing	is	at	least	be	aware	that	it	is...	how	shall	we	say	it?	...	a	thing.	Something	or	other.’	(1993:	268;	italics	original)		vi	Indeed,	Dretske	makes	quite	a	similar	point:	‘It	seems	most	implausible	to	suppose	infants	and	animals	(presumably,	conscious	of	things)	have	concepts	of	this	sort.	If	the	concept	one	must	have	to	be	aware	of	something	is	a	concept	that	applies	to	everything	one	can	be	aware	of,	what	is	the	point	of	insisting	that	one	must	have	it	to	be	aware?’	(1993:	268-269)		vii	A	qua-object	is	distinguished	from	a	property-instance	in	being	a	bona	fide	concrete	particular.	Thus	one	difference	between	the	tree-qua-green	and	the	tree’s	greenness	is	that	you	can	bump	into	the	former	but	not	into	the	latter.	For	the	idea	of	a	qua-object,	see	Fine	1982	(though	the	notion	itself	goes	back	to	Aristotle’s	discussion	of	the	relationship	between	the	man	and	the	musical	man	in	
Physics	I.7).		viii	We	do	recognize	the	measure	of	infelicity	in	the	term	‘thing-introspection.’	What	we	are	introspectively	aware	of	are	clearly	not	‘things’	in	the	ordinary	sense	of	physical	concrete	particulars.	As	we	have	seen	above,	however,	a	‘thing’	in	the	relevant	sense	can	belong	to	any	ontological	category.	This	includes	mental	states,	events,	and	processes,	which	are	the	proper	objects	of	what	we	call	thing-introspection.	If	the	reader	finds	the	label	too	grating,	we	enjoin	her	to	substitute	‘item-introspection’	for	our	‘thing-introspection.’	We	use	the	latter	only	to	underline	the	analogy	with	Dretske’s	distinction.		ix	It	is	worth	noting	the	existence	of	an	intermediary	report	between	‘S	introspects	her	hunger’	and	‘S	introspects	that	she	is	hungry’;	namely,	‘S	introspects	her	hunger	as	a	hunger.’	This	latter	report	is	ostensibly	a	report	of	an	objectual	attitude	but	also	one	of	a	concept-deploying	state.	Accordingly,	we	would	not	admit	it	under	the	rubric	of	thing-introspection	(as	we	use	the	term).	We	are	open	to	two	possibilities.	The	first	is	that	in	addition	to	fact-introspection	and	thing-introspection	there	is	a	third	kind	of	introspection.	The	second	is	that	‘S	introspects	her	hunger	as	hunger’	is	a	misleading	report	of	fact-introspection:	what	it	reports	is	that	S	introspects	that	her	experience	is	a	hunger	experience.			x	Among	them	are	the	argument	from	ineffability	of	conscious	experience	(Schwitzgebel	2008),	the	argument	from	introspective	disagreement	(e.g.,	Bayne	and	Spener	2010),	the	fraternity	initiation	case	(Shoemaker	1996),	and	the	dental	drilling	case	(Rosenthal	2005).	Some	of	them	are	analyzed	in	Giustina	(2015),	and	replied	to	in	terms	of	the	thing-introspection/fact-introspection	distinction.	As	noted,	we	cannot	go	through	all	of	them	here;	we	plan	to	address	them,	using	the	thing-introspection/fact-introspection	distinction,	in	future	work.		xi	On	a	natural	model,	a	propositional	content	such	as	<I	am	hungry>	involves	as	constituents	(i)	the	concept	of	hunger,	(ii)	the	indexical	I-concept,	and	(iii)	a	predicative	link	between	these	two	(whatever	that	amounts	to).	Since	(i)	is	a	constituent	of	the	propositional	content,	it	is	impossible	to	entertain	the	content	without	possessing	and	applying	the	concept	of	hunger.		xii	We	do	not	mean	to	commit	here	to	the	substantive	possibility	of	instantaneous	concept	application.	Perhaps	the	process	running	from	an	experiential	state	to	the	application	of	a	concept	to	that	state	must	take	some	time,	even	if	it	is	automatic.	Our	present	point	is	just	that	our	account	can	accommodate	both	options.		xiii	Thanks	to	Josh	Weisberg	for	this	example.		xiv	You	might	apply	the	concept(s)	DISGUSTING	VISCOUS	EXPERIENCE,	but	this	is	not	a	particularly	gustatory	set	of	concepts:	DISGUSTING	is	rather	an	aesthetic	concept,	VISCOUS	is	rather	a	tactile	concept,	and	EXPERIENCE	is	more	generic	than	gustatory	concepts.			
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																																																																																																																																																																					xv	From	this	perspective,	when	one	mistakenly	fact-introspects	that	one’s	experience	is	such-and-such,	there	is	a	sense	in	which	the	mistake	is	actually	not	one	of	introspection	proper,	but	of	some	downstream	processes.	Imagine	a	patient	whose	eyesight	is	irreproachable,	but	who,	due	to	brain	lesion,	routinely	misapplies	shape	concepts	to	what	she	sees.	As	a	result,	she	seems	to	see	that	the	building	is	square	when	in	fact	it	is	rectangular,	seems	to	see	that	the	stop	sign	is	round	when	in	fact	it	is	octagonal,	and	so	on.	This	patient’s	perceptual	fact-awareness	is	defective,	leading	to	a	preponderance	of	nonveridical	visual	judgments.	And	yet	there	is	a	sense	in	which	vision	proper	is	perfectly	reliable	in	her	–	there	is	nothing	wrong	with	her	eyesight.	It	is	not	clear	to	us	that	fact-introspection	is	as	unreliable	as	it	is	often	claimed	to	be	(Giustina	2015),	but	even	where	it	proves	untrustworthy,	we	maintain	that	the	situation	resembles	that	of	the	above	patient:	introspection	
proper	is	perfectly	reliable,	and	it	is	only	the	downstream	processing	of	introspective	information	that	is	defective.		xvi	We	suppress	here	a	modal	operator:	clearly,	Dretske	can	allow	that	some	conscious	states	are	such	that	their	subject	is	aware	of	them,	Rosenthal	can	allow	that	some	are	such	that	in	virtue	of	being	in	them	we	are	conscious	of	something	else,	and	so	on.	But	what	they	will	deny	is	the	necessity	of	the	presence	of	such	consciousness-of	(in	Dretske’s	case)	or	consciousness-with	(in	Rosenthal’s).		xvii	Might	the	two	come	apart?	There	is	no	reason	why	not.	Consider	the	following	variation	on	the	inverted	spectrum	thought-experiment.	Imagine	two	subjects	whose	spectra	are	not	inverted	but	whose	inner	awareness	is	‘inverted’:	looking	at	a	red	strawberry,	both	enter	a	visual	state	that	represents	the	strawberry	as	red,	but	one’s	inner	awareness	represents	her	visual	state	as	phenomenally	red	while	the	other’s	represents	hers	as	phenomenally	green.	According	to	the	first	version	of	self-representationalism,	the	conscious	state	is	phenomenally	red	but	happens	to	misrepresent	itself.	According	to	the	second	version,	the	conscious	state	is	phenomenally	green,	because	all	there	is	to	a	conscious	state	being	phenomenally	green	is	that	it	represents	itself	as	so.			xviii	Rosenthal	himself	does	not	seem	to	recognize	thing-introspection	in	his	account	of	introspection.	But	a	higher-order	theorist	could,	in	principle,	make	room	for	it.	This	is	especially	feasible	for	a	higher-order	perception	rather	than	higher-order	thought	theorist	(Lycan	1996).		xix	For	a	similar	consideration	see,	e.g.,	Brentano	1874:	121-6.		xx	One	might	object	that	second-order	states	must	be	posited	anyway:	for	example,	we	can	have	beliefs	about	beliefs.	However,	there	is	a	considerable	asymmetry	between	the	two-state	model	and	the	case	of	a	belief	about	a	belief.	In	the	former	case	a	new	kind	of	state	is	introduced	(namely,	the	introspective	second-order	state);	in	the	latter	the	second-order	state	is	not	of	a	new	kind	(it	is	just	another	belief).		xxi	One	might	wonder	how	thing-introspection	is	built	into	the	introspected	state,	and	constitutive	of	its	phenomenal	properties,	given	that	it	requires	additional	attention	resources.	It	is	worth	pointing	out	that	thing-introspection	is	inbuilt	and	constitutive	of	the	introspected	state	as	thing-introspected	–	as	opposed	to	the	relevant	conscious	state	as	non-thing-introspected,	namely,	simply	as	conscious.	The	additional	attention	involved	in	thing-introspection	contributes	to	determine	the	phenomenal	character	of	the	thing-introspected	state.	Therefore,	for	any	conscious	state	C,	the	phenomenal	character	of	C	as	thing-introspected	might	be	different	from	that	of	C	as	non-thing-introspected.		xxii	A	completely	different	but	coherent	view	in	this	area	is	that	fact-awareness	and	belief	are	in	reality	two	different	descriptions	of	one	and	the	same	state	–	perceiving	that	the	table	is	brown	just	is	believing	that	the	table	is	brown.	(Dretske	himself	often	sounds	like	that.)	We	set	aside	this	view	for	purely	strategic	reasons:	we	indulge	our	opponent’s	supposition	that	an	extra	step	is	needed	here	in	order	to	form	phenomenal	beliefs,	and	show	that	even	so,	phenomenal	beliefs	are	on	the	whole	justified.		
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																																																																																																																																																																					xxiii	In	addition,	there	may	be	a	small	subset	of	phenomenal	beliefs	that	are	infallible,	namely,	phenomenal	beliefs	with	the	content	<this	is	like	that>.	Whether	this	is	so	will	depend	on	whether	it	is	possible	to	endorse	a	fact-introspective	state	with	that	content	without	introducing	the	possibility	of	error	–	something	we	have	not	discussed	here.		xxiv	Obviously,	many	challenges	would	have	to	be	faced	up	to	before	this	account	can	be	taken	to	be	complete.	For	example,	we	have	said	nothing	here	about	how	we	might	address	the	problem	of	‘myth	of	the	given’	(Sellars	1956),	that	is,	the	problem	surrounding	how	a	non-conceptual	state	could	justify	a	conceptual	one,	or	even	enter	the	so-called	space	of	reasons.		xxv	For	comments	on	a	previous	draft,	we	are	grateful	to	Jonathan	Farrell,	Brie	Gertler,	and	Tom	McClelland.	We	have	also	benefited	from	a	presentation	at	Taiwan	Medical	University;	we	are	grateful	to	the	audience	there,	in	particular	Alex	Byrne,	Austen	Clark,	Sam	Coleman,	and	Kevin	Kimble.		
